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The practitioner must for the time being attempt to
judge whether the language in the instant case is but
illustrative of the difficulty of the application of the exist-
ing rule or whether it represents a move of the Court
toward frank recognition that unimpeached and uncontra-
dicted evidence may under proper circumstances call for
a directed verdict even in favor of the party having the
burden of proof.
LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE IN PARKING-
EFFECT OF STATUTE
Hochschild, Kohn & Co. v. Canoles1
The plaintiff's evidence showed that he had parked his
automobile on the lower slope of a city street with the
wheels closely in line with the curb. Witnesses saw the
defendant's oil truck running down the steep incline with
no one in the driver's seat, and with the defendant's driver
vainly running behind the truck in an endeavor to catch it.
The truck struck the plaintiff's automobile, and threw the
plaintiff therefrom with the result that he was permanently
injured. The plaintiff rested his case upon the theory that
the facts recited raised a presumption of negligence on
the part of the defendant. The defendant's evidence showed
that his driver had been in the act of making a delivery
of oil to a customer when he parked on the incline above
the plaintiff. The driver testified that in parking he set the
hand brake as tightly as he could, put the gear in neutral,
turned the wheel of the oil truck slightly to the curb at
about five inches from it, and allowed the motor to con-
tinue running. He then went to the rear of the house to
check the oil tank, returned to the truck, and pulled the
hose to the rear of the house to make the connection. When
the oil truck began to move, the driver testified that he
was a distance of approximately one hundred feet from it.
He ran after the truck but was unable to overtake it. The
driver had previously had trouble with the foot brake, and
had taken the truck to an independent mechanic to have
this brake investigated. In the course of his investigation
the mechanic discovered that the hand brake was not
operating properly. He did not, however, correct the trouble
with the hand brake. The mechanic testified that the ratchet
and pawl of the hand brake were not properly engaged,
166 A. 2d 780 (Md. 1949).
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and that it was his opinion that the vibration of the motor
in pumping the oil would cause them to fly apart and release
the brake. The defendant moved for a directed verdict on
the ground that there was no evidence in the case legally
sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover against it. The
trial court overruled the motion, and allowed the case
to go to the jury on the question of negligence. The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, held that
there had been sufficient evidence of negligence to submit
the case to the jury.
The interesting point of the instant case is that it in-
volved a violation of Article 66 , Section 192 of the Mary-
land Code, which provides that certain precautions must
be taken when a motor vehicle is parked and left un-
attended.'
The cases dealing with unattended motor vehicles may
be divided into two categories according to the factual
situations involved: (1) Where the vehicle is parked on a
perceptible grade and adequate precautions are not taken
to prevent its running away; (2) Where the driver has
parked a vehicle, leaving it unattended, in such condition
as not to comply with the statute, and a third person inter-
feres causing injury to himself or another. In either cate-
gory, the existence, or non-existence, of a statutory stand-
ard of care may be a significant factor which has varied
from state to state.
Before the statute in question was enacted the Court of
Appeals had considered this problem in the case of Ameri-
can Express Co. v. Terry,3 where plaintiff was permitted
to recover for injury to himself in attempting to stop a
runaway truck. In that case it was held that it is not negli-
gence per se4 to leave a motor vehicle unattended in a
public street, provided the one in charge exercises such
care as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under
the circumstances. Most courts, in the absence of statutes,
have agreed with the American Express Co. case and have
2Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 6612, Sec. 192 provides: "No person driving
or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without
first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and removing the key, or
when standing upon any perceptible grade without effectively setting the
brake thereon and turning the front wheels to the curb or side of the
highway."
'126 Md. 254, 94 A. 1026, Ann. Cas. 1917 C (1915).
The cases employing the term "negligence per se" often do so loosely.
It is often used in the sense that the conduct in question constituted pre-
sumptive evidence of negligence only. The term is used here in the sense
that the conduct in question constituted negligence as a matter of law. See
cases collected in 170 A. L. R. 661.
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held that where the vehicle is parked on a perceptible grade
and left unattended the question of negligence is for the
jury.' Furthermore the Court in the American Express Co.
case held that if a car is parked on a perceptible grade, un-
attended, and without fixing the brakes, and turning the
front wheels to the curb, a strong implication of negligence
arises from which the jury might well find the defendant
liable.' This is also the majority view in the absence of
statute.7
Some of the reported cases require nothing more to be
shown than that the defendant parked the car on a grade
and that, shortly after the defendant left, the vehicle rolled
down the grade injuring the plaintiff.' In most cases so
holding, the time interval between the parking of the car
and the running away was short.9 These cases are based
upon the rule of res ipsa loquitur, viz: "When a thing that
causes injury without fault of the injured person is shown
to be under the exclusive control of the defendant, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not occur if the one having such control uses proper care,
it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of explana-
tion, that the injury arose from the defendant's want of
care."'" However, most courts, in the absence of statutes,
have required the plaintiff to show that the defendant
failed to exercise reasonable care, holding that negligence
is a question to be determined from the facts by the jury.
Such was the holding of the American Express Co. case.
Since the problem is the proof of negligence, and most
courts prior to the enactment of statutes similar to Article
66/2, Section 192, held that if the brakes were not set and
the front wheels turned to the curb a strong implication
of negligence arose, the purpose of the statute in requiring
such precautions would seem to be to place a positive duty
upon the defendant which if violated would constitute
negligence. Most courts have so interpreted such statutes,
ISpanko v. Spitalnick, 101 N. J. 5, 127 A. 663 (1925), Hughes v.
Rentschler Floral Co., 193 Wis. 49, 213 N. W. 625 (1927). Sheridan v.
Arrow Sanitary Laundry Co., 105 N. J. 1, 608, 146 A. 191 (1929).
Supra, n. 3, 261.
'Latky v. Wolfe, 85 Cal. App. 332, 259 Pac. 470 (1927), Henderson v.
Horner, 287 Pa. 298, 135 A. 203 (1926), Elliott v. Seattle Chain & Mfg. Co.,
141 Wash. 157, 251 Pac. 117 (1926), and Fuller v. Magatti, 231 Mich. 213,
203 N. W. 868 (1925).
'Biller v. Meyer, 33 F. 2d 440 (7th Cir. 1929), 66 A. L. R. 43 C.
'Glasser v. Schroeder, 269 Mass. 337, 168 N. E. 809 (1929).
10 Biller v. Meyer, supra, n. 8. For a discussion of the Maryland cases on
the general topic of res ipsa loquitor see Thomsen, Presumptions and
Burden of Proof in Res Ipsa Loquitor Cases in Maryland, 3 Md. L. Rev. 285
(1939), Farinholt, Comment, Res Ipsa Loquitar, 10 Md. L. Rev. 337 (1949).
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holding that where the vehicle is parked in violation of
the statute the defendant is negligent per se." If such a
view be accepted, the plaintiff need only show a violation
of the statute to set up his case of negligence. Such a hold-
ing does not preclude the defendant from showing contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, but it does
serve the purpose of establishing defendant's negligence
in the first instance.1 2
The principal case deals with the problem of the statute
for the first time in Maryland as applied to category num-
ber one above, that is where no third party has inter-
fered. The court could have overlooked the statute and
reached the same conclusion it did on the authority of the
American Express Co. case,"3 or it could well have decided
that the statute set up a standard of conduct which if vio-
lated would constitute negligence as a matter of law. In-
stead the court discussed the case from the standpoint of
negligence in general; and, although the requirements of
the statute were discussed, the opinion did not clearly
rest its conclusion on the violation thereof. The growing
tendency in other states is to interpret such a statute as
one of that class which set up a statutory standard of con-
duct which if not met establishes negligence as a matter
of law.14 Such an interpretation is a reasonable one, and
might well have been applied as a direct basis for finding
negligence in the instant case.
Where the statute which is violated in a particular
case is interpreted as intended to protect a certain class
of persons of which the plaintiff is a member against the
risk of the type of harm which has in fact occurred, the
great weight of authority holds that the violation is negli-
gence in itself, and that the court must so direct the jury.1
Precedent in Maryland, however, is against such statutory
interpretation. Sothoron v. West 6 involved a violation of
Article 56, Section 194 (1) of the Maryland Code which
provides that every vehicle while in use in the public high-
ways should be provided with adequate brakes. The court
in ruling on the effect of the violation said: "In some states
I McCoy v. Courtney, 25 Wash. 2d 956, 172 P. 2d 596, 170 A. L. R. 603
(1946), Jacklin v. North Coast Transportation Co., 165 Wash. 236, 5 P.
2d 325 (1931).
McCoy v. Courtney, 8upra, n. 11.
21 Supra, n. 3.
14 Supra, n. 11.
" Martin v. Herzog, 228 N. Y. 164, 126 N. E. 814 (1920), Schell v. DuBois,
94 Ohio 93, 113 N. . 664 (1916), Annis v. Britton, 232 Mich. 291, 205 N. W.
128 (1925), Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N. W. 543 (1889).18180 Md. 539, 26 A. 2d 16 (1942).
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having similar statutes, it has been held that driving with
defective brakes is negligence per se. The better and more
general rule, however, seems to be that failure of brakes
to operate makes only a prima facie case which the driver
may defend by showing proper inspection." The court then
held that the violation raised only a prima facie presump-
tion of negligence. This is not, as the court seemed to think,
the view of the majority of states. The rule supported by
the weight of authority is that the violation of a statute
or ordinance containing specific requirements as to brakes
is negligence per se.1"
The earlier Maryland case of Kelly v. Huber Baking
Co."8 involved the violation of a statute which required
that all vehicles upon meeting others upon public highways
must turn to the right of the center of the highway so as
to pass without interference. The Court in discussing the
statute said: "While it has been generally held that such
a statute may create a prima facie presumption of negli-
gence, it has never been held in this state to be negligence
per se." The Court cited no authority for this statement,
but it has since been referred to with approval in several
Maryland cases. 9 These cases present a potential barrier
to a future adoption in Maryland of the majority rule that
a violation of such a statute is negligence as a matter of
law.
The cases dealing with the problem of an interfering
third person (second category above) have generally held,
in the absence of statute, that the liability of the driver,
who parked the car is a question of fact for the determina-
tion of the jury. 0 This has been held even though the
vehicle was left unlocked with the key in the ignition."
According to these decisions the injured person must show
that the defendant had under the circumstances been negli-
gent, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury.2 Some courts in jurisdictions which have
enacted statutes similar to Article 661 , Section 192 have
" Harden v. Harden, 29 Ala. App. 44, 197 So. 94 (1940), Womack v.
Preach, 63 Ariz. 390, 163 P. 2d 280 (1946), Smith v. Finkel, 130 Conn. 354,
34 A. 2d 209 (1943), Black v. Ambs, 307 Mich. 644, 12 N. W. 2d 381 (1943),
Fysinger v. Coble Dairy Products, 225 N. C. 717, 36 S. E. 2d 246 (1945).
145 Md. 321, 125 A. 782 (1924).
'
9 Consol. Gas, Etc. Co. v. O'Neill, 175 Md. 47, 200 A. 359 (1938), Kaline
v. Davidson, 146 Md. 220, 126 A. 68 (1924).
20Connell v. Berland, 248 N. Y. 641, 162 N. E. 557 (1928), Don v. J. S.
Ivins, 90 Pa. Super. Ct. 105 (1927), Bergman v. Williams, 173 Minn. 250,
217 N. W. 127 (1927), Albanon v. Tapley & Co., 234 N. Y. 522, 138 N. E. 431
(1922).
Schaff v. R. W. Claxton, Inc., 79 App. D. C. 207, 144 F. 2d 532 (1944).
" Supra, n. 16.
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likewise held that where a person intermeddles with the
vehicle parked in violation of the statute the question of
the defendant's liability is for the jury.23 Other courts
have held as a matter of law that the defendant's negligence
is superseded by the act of the third party who intermed-
dles24 Such courts have little difficulty in disposing of the
defendant's liability by applying the rule of an intervening
cause which supersedes the defendant's negligence. This
rule relieving the defendant of liability as a matter of law
has been applied where the intermeddler himself has been
injured,25 as well as where the injury was to some third
party.26 Two Massachusetts cases," in the face of a statute
similar to Article 66 , Section 192, held that where a
vehicle was parked by the defendant with the key left in
the ignition the act of a thief in running down a pedestrian
was as a matter of law such an intervening act as to
supersede the defendant's negligence in violating the
statute. The Court in Sullivan v. Griffin" said that the
interference by thieves with a parked vehicle was not one
of the "consequences that were intended to be prevented"
by the statute.
A few recent cases have reached a result opposed to the
earlier decisions. These cases hold that a violation of the
statute imposes liability on the owner or operater as a
matter of law even though a third person has intermed-
dled.2 9 The case of Ross v. Hartman" decided in the District
of Columbia reaches such a result. In that case the defend-
ant's truck driver in violation of a traffic ordinance left the
truck parked in a public alley with the ignition switch
unlocked, and the key in the switch. Two hours later an
unknown and unauthorized person drove the truck away,
and in making his escape negligently ran down the plain-
tiff. The Court stated that, in absence of a statute, the
leaving of the truck in such condition might be negligence
"Moran v. Borden Co., 309 Ill. App. 391, 33 N. E. 2d 166 (1941), Malloy
v. Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N. E. 2d 1001 (1941).
2'Castay v. Katz & Besthoff, 148 So. 76 (La. App. 1933) ; Mann v. Parshall,
229 App. Div. 336, 241 N. Y. S. 673 (1930).
Wright v. Powers & Sons, 238 Ky. 572,38 S. W. 2d 465 (1931).
Rapczywski v. W. T. Cowan, Inc., 138 Pa. Sup. Ct. 392, 10 A. 2d 810
(1940).
21 Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N. E. 778 (1927), Sullivan
v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359,61 N. E. 2d 330 (1945).
28 Supra, n. 27.
2Ross v. Hartman, 78 App. D. C. 217, 139 F. 2d 14 (1943), Maggoire v.
Laundry & Dry Cleaning Service, 150 So. 394 (La. App. 1933), Ostergard
v. Frisch, 333 Ill. A. 359, 77 N. E. 2d 537 (1948), Bullock v. Dahlstrom, 46 A.
2d 370 (D. C. Mun. App., 1946).
30 Ross v. Hartman, supra, n. 29.
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according to the circumstances, but that the existence of
the ordinance made parking without taking the required
precautions negligence, and that the negligence and causa-
tion were too clear for submission to the jury. In justifica-
tion of this the Court said: "The evident purpose of requir-
ing motor vehicles to be locked is not to prevent theft for
the sake of the owner or the police, but to promote the
safety of the public in the streets. Since it is a safety
measure, its violation is negligence." The Court was careful
to point out that a person is not liable for all harm that
might follow a violation of a safety ordinance, but if the
harm that results springs directly from the violation and
is the type that the ordinance was designed to prevent then
liability should be imposed. Statutes designed for the
public safety have generally been so construed.3 1
Ostergard v. Frisch,32 a recent Illinois case reached the
same result as the Ross case when a similar statute was
violated and the intermeddler was a thief. The Illinois
court likewise based its decision on the idea that the statute
was enacted for the benefit of the public, and that any
harm arising from a violation would impose liability on
the operator as a matter of law. There was a strong dis-
sent in the case, however, which felt that the criminal
act of the thief in stealing the car, plus his tortious act
in negligently operating it, and not the negligent parking
of the car, was the proximate cause of the injury. As
pointed out earlier there is much authority for this view.3
However, the majority opinion in the Ostergard case and
the court in the Ross case did not doubt that the inter-
meddler's acts were the proximate cause of the harm, but
it was felt in both cases that this was immaterial in the
light of the purpose of the statute as construed by the
Court. As stated in the Ostergard case: "Proximate cause
has been fertile field for a contrariety of opinion. In de-
termining whether the negligence involved in the violation
of the statute is the proximate cause of the resulting injury,
the statute may by its obvious intent enlarge upon the
general definition of proximate cause. '3 4
In both the Ostergard case and the Ross case the thief
was still in flight when the plaintiff was harmed. This would
seem to be the type of situation at which the statute is
1 Supra, n. 15, Flynn v. Gordon, 86 N. H. 198, 165 A. 715 (1933), Larri-
more v. Amer. Nat. Ins. Co., 184 Okla. 614, 89 P. 2d 340 (1939), RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS, Sec. 286.
Ostergard v. Frisch, supra, n. 29.
Supra, n. 24, 27.
Italics supplied. Ostergard v. Frisch, supra, n. 29.
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aimed, and to which the defendant's liability should be
limited. A recent case35 has held that protection should be
extended only to harm arising immediately following the
act of the intermeddler, and in the case of a thief only to
his immediate flight.
While no Maryland case deals squarely with the factual
situation under consideration, it is to be noted that in the
instant case the Court uses language in construing the
purpose of the statute which is practically identical with
those cases which have held the owner or operator liable
even though there is an intermeddler who may be a thief,36
saying: "The purpose of Section 192 was either to prevent
some unauthorized person from starting the car or to pre-
vent the starting of the car by gravity. In either case the
object was the protection of the public."37 Such language
could easily suggest that the Court of Appeals would reach
the same result as the Ross and Ostergard cases if a similar
situation should be presented to it. However, the holdings
of the Maryland cases which rejected the idea of a legisla-
tive determined standard of care for establishing negli-
gence as a matter of law," stand as a potential bar to such
a result.
DRAINAGE OF SURFACE WATERS UNDER THE
CIVIL LAW RULE AS APPLIED IN MARYLAND
Bishop v. Richard'
Biberman v. Funkhouser2
In the case of Bishop v. Richard,3 the plaintiff, Richard,
filed a bill in equity to have the defendant, Bishop, enjoined
from interfering in any way with the plaintiff's going on
defendant's land and "cleaning the said ditches in a rea-
sonable and proper manner so that the ditches may be
restored to their former condition in order that they will
8Wannebo v. Gates, 227 Minn. 194, 34 N. W. 2d 695 (1948).
Supra, n. 29.Italics supplied. Supra, n. 1, 783.
See text circa, n. 16, 18 and 19.
165 A. 2d 334 (Md. 1949).
*58 A. 2d 668 (Md. 1948).
* Supra, n. 1. Since the two recent Maryland cases of Bishop V. Richard
and Biberman v. Funkhouser are closely related cases on the problem of
the right of drainage of surface waters under the civil law rule, they are
combined in this casenote for the purpose of discussion of the civil law
rule in Maryland.
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